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Are Lock-In Contracts for Heating Oil Unconscionable Under 
the Uniform Commercial 
Code? 
A Teaching Exercise in Contract Law 
by 
Sharlene A. McEvoy* 
ABSTRACT 
There has been a trend in recent years for heating oil 
companies to encourage customers to "lock in" a price for a 
season as a hedge against an increase in oil prices. This paper 
analyzes the issue in light of the unconscionable contract 
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past few years the cost of home heating oil has 
increased dramatically as the price of a barrel of oil 
skyrocketed to nearly $150.00 a barrel during the summer of 
2008.' 
Because some analysts had predicted that oil might 
go as high as $200.00 per barrel, many consumers became 
anxious about their ability to pay for home heating oil 
during the winter of2008-2009. 
*Dr. Sharlene A. McEvoy is a Professor of Business Law at 
Fairfield University's Charles F. Dolan School of Business 
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As a result, some entered into contracts during the 
summer of 2008 with heating oil companies when the price 
per gallon was between $3.80 and $4.28 which was the going 
rate as late as September 2008.2 
In the eight weeks before the Presidential election and in 
the months that followed, the price per barrel of oil fell 
dramatically which resulted in lower prices for gasoline and 
heating oil. Those who believed that it was prudent to lock in a 
price are now dismayed to learn that their neighbors who did 
not enter such contracts are paying as little as $2.00 - $2.50 per 
gallon. 
For example, Barbara Daley, who is 176 and lives on 
Long Island, entered into a contract with a heating oil company 
with whom she has done business for 30-35 years. Her lock-in 
price was $4.22 per gallon. Ms. Daley regrets entering the 
contract and would like to modify it. However one proviso of 
the agreement states that it will cost her $599.00 to terminate 
the contract, which is approximately the price of a single oil 
delivery.3 
While it is not known how many consumers entered 
such agreements, estimates are that thousands of 
homeowners signed contracts during the summer 200 - . 
Some signed on in July when the price peaked at $4.78 per 
gallon.4 
Others have entered agreements which 11cap the 
maximum price they must pay but permits them to pay less if 
the price drops.5 While these consumers are in better shape 
than those who entered the fixed price deals, the oil companies 
included provisions in the contracts which allow them to 
charge ten to twenty cents more than the going rate as a hedge 
against, any further sharp drop in oil prices.6 
Are these contracts unenforceable under the Uniform 
Commercial Code provision 2-302 which covers the concept of 
unconscionability? The landmark case on such provisions in 
adhesion contracts is Jones v. Star Credit Corp.7 
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Cliffon and Cora Jones, both welfare recipients, agreed 
to purchase a home freezer from Your Shop at !-Tome 
Service, Inc. For $900.00 with the addition of such charges as 
credit life insurance, credit property insurance and sales tax. 
The total price came to $1439.69. The Jones1 paid $619.88 
toward the freezer. The defendant claimed that with all the 
added chares there was a balance due of $819.8 1.8 
At trial evidence showed that the freezer had a 
maximum retail value of $300.9 The issue in the case 
was whether this contract would be considered 
11unconscionable11 under 2-302 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code which provides: 
If the court, as a matter oflaw, finds 
the contract or any clause to have 
been unconscionable at the time it 
was made, the court may refuse to 
enforce the contract, or it may 
enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so 
limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result.1o 
The Supreme Court ofNew York held that contract 
was unconscionable and ordered the contract reformed so 
that the $619.88 already paid by the Jones would 
constitute the entire purchase price. 11 
In his opinion, the judge reviewed the fact that when 
11caveat emptor11 reined, the parties had 11Unbridled latitude11 to 
make their own contracts, which allowed 11exploitive and 
callous practices which shocked the conscience of the 
legislature and the courts11 • 12 
The judge cited the importance of preserving the 
integrity of contracts allowing parties 11tO deal, trade, bargain, 
and contract.11 Another concern, however, is for the 
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uneducated, illiterate and the poor, .who are the most likely 
victims of merchants who would prey on them. '3 
The judge cited 2-302 of the UCC as enacting "the 
moral sense of the community into the law of commercial 
transactions" .'4 Section 2-302 allows a court to find that a 
contract or clause in it "was unconscionable at the time it was 
made, permitting the court may do one of three things: refuse 
to enforce the contract, eliminate the offending clause or limit 
the impact of the clause" to avoid an unconscionable result." 16 
The Official Comment to 2-302 states that its purpose is 
to prevent "oppression or unfair sui prise" 17 
The judge commented that 2-302 covers the price term 
of a contract. "Indeed, no other provision of an agreement 
more intimately touches upon the question of 
unconscionability than does the term regarding price." 18 
The judge stated that the mathematical disparity between 
$300, which presumably includes a reasonable profit margin 
and $900, which is exorbitant on its face, the greatest 
weight." 19 
The judge cautioned that price disparity is not the only 
factor governing unconscionability. Other factors include the 
"limited financial resources" of the buyers which can weigh 
in the court's decision.20 
From the perspective of the heating oil customer, the 
lock-in contracts would appear to meet the "Jones" test of 
being unconscionable. Many of these contracts were entered 
into in the summer of 2008 when oil prices reached their high 
water mark and when some analysts were predicting that 
heating oil might go to $6.00 per gallon if the price-per barrel 
of oil soared to over $200-$250. Elderly consumers who live 
on fixed incomes were fearful that if they did not lock in at the 
summer price, cold weather in the fall and winter would cause 
prices to rise even more, thus making their financial situation 
even more precarious. 
By late fall 2008 however, some oil dealers were 
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selling heating fuel for under $2.50 a gallon. Those who 
locked in are paying 55% more per gallon in some cases,2l 
From the oil companies' point of view these 
agreements are not unreasonable. They argue that they are 
being blamed for a situation over which they have no 
control. They believe that large oil refiners and wholesalers 
set the prices and when customers signed the contracts 
during the summer 2008, by law in some states dealers had 
to 
purchase 80% of the oil from the wholesalers at then prevailing 
prices to cover the contracts or purchase a surety bond to cover 
re-buy and fixed price agreement obligations.22 Therefore, if 
they were to cut prices in response to the current market, they 
would lose money and possibly their business because they are 
already locked into their 
costs .23 
The problem became so acute in November 2008 with 
consumers clamoring for recission of their contracts, that the 
Independent Connecticut Petroleum Associates (ICP A) joined 
with other oil heat associations in the Northeast to ask the 
Secretary of the Treasury for loans to help buy out the 
contracts of those who signed on at the high price and 
exchange them for less expensive agreements. 24 Such an 
arrangement would permit consumers to get the lower 
prevailing prices and preserve the profits for the oil dealer 
who would be reimbursed for the oil they had purchased at the 
high price. 
The saga of the "locked in" heating oil contracts 
provides an excellent case study to teach students about the 
principles of contract law as well as the concept of 
unconscionable agreements under 2-302 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Since many textbooks offer an edited 
version of Jones v. Star Credit Corp, 25 the case provides an 
excellent springboard for teaching about unconscionable 
contracts and individuals who might be particularly 
2011 / Lock-In Contracts/90 
vulnerable. 
Among the questions that might be posed to students 
are: 
Is a heating oil contract covered under the UCC or is it 
a contract for a service i.e. delivery of a commodity? 
2. Ask students to compare the facts of Jones with that of 
Barbara Daley, an elderly woman who lives on a fixed 
income? 
3. Did Daley and others have all the facts when they 
decided to enter a "lock in" contract? Who does 
have such information? The oil dealers? 
Economists? Refiners? 
4. If Daley and others were to sue, claiming 
unconscionability under 2-302, would 
they be successful and what counter arguments 
would the defendant dealers make? 
5. Are lock-in contracts ethical if neither the consumer 
nor the dealer has perfect information? Is there an 
argument for fraud, mutual mistake, or economic 
duress which would offer the possibility of rescission? 
6. Ask the students to apply the judge's reasoning in 
Jones to the "lock in" cases. Is that decision 
applicable to this situation? 
7. Did state law make the problem worse by 
forcing dealers to buy oil when contracts were 
made? 
8, The Independent Petroleum Dealers Association appealed 
to the Secretary of the Treasury to get relief from the 
rescue package, T ARP? Should taxpayer money be 
allocated to dealers to buy out customers who locked 
in? 
9. Is this the kind of relief Congress intended when it 
passed the bailout package? 
Another possible avenue of relief for disgruntled 
consumers is to examine their contracts to determine if they 
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are in compliance with Connecticut law2 6 which states: 
"A contract for the retail sale of 
home heating oil that offers a 
guaranteed price plan including 
fixed price contracts and any other 
similar terms shall be in writing and 
the terms and conditions of such 
price plans shall be disclosed. Such 
disclosure shall be in plain language 
and shall immediately follow the 
language concerning the price or 
service that could be affected and 
shall be printed in no less than 
twelve point boldface type of 
uniform font." 
Students can be asked to examine samples of "lock-in" 
contracts to determine if they are in compliance with this law. 
(See Appendix) Some of the agreements contain 
"liquidated damages" provisions. Ask the students to examine 
these clauses and decide if they are "reasonable". The Office of 
the Attorney General of Connecticut "encourages customers to 
contact their fuel oil dealer and discuss the possibility of 
working out another price with the understanding that the 
dealer is not obligated to do so.27 Students can discuss the 
ethical responsibilities of the oil dealers. Would it be "good 
business" for the oil company to do so to win customer loyalty 
even though letting customers rescind will cause the companies 
to lose profits? Do states have an ethical or legal obligation to 
step in and lessen the burden on oppressed customers 
especially when an essential commodity like heating oil is 
involved? Should the states buy out these contracts? 
CONCLUSION 
It would seem that the 2-302 would not apply to these 
oil contracts. In essence, consumers bet on the market, namely, 
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that the price of oil would go up and that they would be 
protected. As it happened, that wager did not pay off in 2008. 
The oil delivery companies did not take advantage of their 
customers because they had to purchase oil at high prices to 
fulfill the agreements. 
Consumers must realize that a signed contract means 
business that they are legally bound and can be sued for breach 
if they back out. Both customers and dealers were victims of a 
volatile market. 
A possible solution would be for legislators to ban oil 
companies from offering lock-in contracts. Thus, dealers will 
not be forced to buy oil before customers seek delivery. 
Customers will not have to worry that they have made a bad 
bargain that will come back to haunt them. Students can be 
asked for their opinion on such a law. 
The legislature should allow oil companies to offer 
"capped price" contracts only with reasonable premiums if the 
price drops. Those who choose this option know that they will 
not be liable to pay more than a certain price for the heating oil. 
Students might offer recommendations for a change in the 
Connecticut statute to avoid problems in the future . 
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